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Abstract 
Scholars differentiate the concepts of internationalism and transnationalism. While 
the first refers to the connectivity between macro institutions such as states, 
multinational corporations and other institutionalized actors within and beyond 
national boundaries, the second term emphasizes public movements, 
organizations and communities engaged in de-territorialized socio‐cultural, political 
and economic activities. This paper focuses on the role of transnational NGOs 
(TNGOs) in recent developments in Egypt. The current scholarly debate on the 
so‐called “Arab spring” considers the mobilization of disempowered youth, intense 
media-tech application and sustained international pressure as crucial to ousting 
authoritarian regimes in North Africa. Delineating the role of TNGOs complements 
such findings. TNGO activities and responses to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and 
to the ensuing coup in 2013 reveal the capability of such organizations to balance 
civic transformational oriented mobilizations with state centred institutional 
considerations. Furthermore though TNGOs cannot directly change the current 
political stalemate in Egypt, the power elite might misinterpret the changing and 
sometimes contradictory positions of these organizations and might eventually 
encourage the return to authoritarianism. After introductory remarks on the 
background of the uprising, the paper proceeds to theoretical discussion of 
transnational engagement followed by recent historical and current empirical 
developments.      
 
Introduction  
Among the countries of the “Arab spring” in the Middle East and North Africa only 
Egypt claims both a popular revolution and a coup. With a civic revolt in 2011 
Egyptians mobilized resources to overthrow an authoritarian ruler. Two years later 
with a military coup the public fragmented into antagonistic factions: (i) those 
continuously insisting “shariyah”, the legality of the original revolution of the 25th 
January 2011; and (ii) proponents of the “inqilab”, the army takeover of July 3rd 
2013. This paper explores the role of transnational NGOs (TNGOs)1 in this 
unresolved political stalemate.  
With nationwide mass protests in January 2011 Egyptians demanded “rahil”, 
the departure of Hosni Mubarak, the country’s long term autocratic ruler. Protesters 
called for “Eish” bread (Life) “karama” dignity and “huriya” freedom for all. These 
euphoric public eruptions marked the culmination of long term entrenched civic 
engagement. Over the years Egyptian activists established grassroots critical 
social movements and organizations to directly and indirectly challenge the military 
                                                 
1 “We define Transnational NGOs as organizations that normally operate, recruit membership and 
attract funding from more than three nations.” “The term “transnational” refers to activities, 
organizations, and movements that occur across national boundaries with limited or no involvement 
by national governments. Use of the term “transnational” as opposed to “international” is intended to 
accentuate the fact that the activities, organizations, and movements being described do not occur 
at the behest of national governments”. See more in Peter N. Stearns (eds.), Oxford Encyclopedia 
of the Modern World, OUP, 2008.  
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regime. With diverse civic associational life Egyptian NGOs filled the welfare gap 
left by the state in providing basic services for vulnerable communities. Meanwhile 
domestic movements complemented the national civic efforts with trans-boundary 
interaction and collaboration with TNGOs. Such transnational connections enabled 
local NGOs to join global civil society mobilizations, particularly struggles 
concerning peace and social justice in connection to the Iraq wars and Palestinian 
intifadas2. The participation of transnational actors with embedded framing 
opportunities strengthened the foundations for subsequent popular uprising that for 
the Egyptians reached a climax with the fall of Mubarak3.   
Later a military-administered distressful transitional period ended with an 
internationally observed democratic experiment in 2012. Among the winners of the 
closely contested national election included activists and leaders from earlier 
politically oppressed movements and NGOs. In retrospect the transformation was 
historic for the troubled nation. The transition, however, cultivated a more 
confrontational political conundrum. The electoral success of the Muslim 
brotherhood undermined the fragile national and transnational civic convergence 
that earlier disgraced authoritarianism. In Egypt Islamist resistance has a long 
history. For instance the Muslim brotherhood alongside associated organizations 
had for almost one hundred years pursued a counter-hegemonic platform. The 
movement resisted colonial power accumulation and the coercion of successive 
military regimes. Both colonial powers and the military oppressed religious 
organizations, while occasionally behind the scenes negotiating with the 
leadership. Over the years the brotherhood maintained a civic mobilization profile 
with, for instance, private educational institutions and clinics enabling the 
organization sometimes to operate as a de-facto welfare state. As the uprising 
gained momentum, although not among the prime initiators, the brotherhood 
promptly capitalized on the volatile situation for political ends. Unlike the digitally 
minded youth and non-activist civic components, the brotherhood maintained 
certain organic connections to local communities. Consequently the civic 
mobilizations congregating at Tahrir and other Egyptian squares for the common 
objective of “isqad al-nidam” the fall of the regime reverberated into diverging 
                                                 
2 Maha Abdelrahman. With the Islamists? Sometimes, With the State? Never!’ “Cooperation 
between the Left and Islamists in Egypt”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2009, 36:1, 37-
54. 
3 Naomi Sakr. “Foreign Support for Media Freedom Advocacy in the Arab Mediterranean: 
Globalization from Above or Below?” Mediterranean Politics, 2006, 11/1: 1–20. 
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ideological clashes; return to belligerent military rule interweaved with prospective 
civil conflict4.    
 
The problem     
This study focuses on the contradictory response by some TNGOs to the January 
25th uprising and the military coup in July 2013. The paper argues that the 
inconsistent proclamations by such organizations reflect broader national and 
transnational civic divergence. For instance, Human Rights Watch, a focal TNGO 
operating in Egypt, applauded the January 2011 upheaval describing it as the 
product of “Egypt’s transformers and revolutionaries”5. In comparison the 
organization’s response to the military coup in July 2013 expressed caution that 
“Egyptian authorities should take the necessary steps to protect churches and 
religious institutions against mob attacks”6. Absent from the statement was 
reference to the revolutionaries in 2011 and there was unwillingness to categorize 
the military takeover as a coup. Even the prime stakeholders, the Egyptians, 
remain divided in determining the classification of such a dramatic national rupture. 
This is due to the leaders of the decades’ long military rule often legitimizing the 
acquisition power with violence and with constitutions dividing society.  
Another US based powerful TNGO, the Carter Center, had a similar 
approach to the Egyptian turmoil. The former president, Jimmy Carter, who leads 
this organization has a somewhat paradoxical relationship with Egypt. Under his 
presidential supervision, the Camp David treaty mediating Egypt and Israel 
sponsored and launched a long term US-Egypt security partnership. The retired 
statesman, and a Nobel laureate, this time as the head of a civic transnational 
platform, articulated willingness to help Egyptians towards “self-governance”. The 
dual approach to the Egyptian predicament seems clearer when in response to the 
Egyptian uprising Carter on behalf of the Carter Centre “Congratulate[d] the people 
of Egypt on their courageous steps toward a new era of democratic legitimacy and 
respect for human rights… [and let Egyptians] know that they have the support of 
the international community as they embark on the difficult path of building a truly 
democratic nation"7. During the parliamentary elections and the short lived Morsi’ 
                                                 
4 Faiqa Mahmood. “Evolving Civil-Military Relations:  a comparative analysis of Egypt, Turkey and 
Pakistan” Research Paper for Ibn-Khaldun Center for Development Studies, August 2013. 
5 Feature by Human Rights Watch at: http://www.hrw.org/features/revolutionaries-egypts-
transformers 
6 Statement by Human Rights Watch at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-
used-excessive-lethal-force.  
7 Carter Center statement at:  http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-021111.html.  
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presidency both the US embassy in Cairo and the Carter Center sponsored 
numerous coordination meetings to “mediate” opposing political forces in Egypt8. 
Later reacting to the military coup the Carter Center refrained from direct 
association with Egyptian protesters but instead “Placed an extra responsibility on 
the armed security forces of Egypt to remain within reasonable limitations of not 
only applying lethal force but also showing fundamental respect for the human 
rights of their fellow Egyptians”9. Furthermore when Morsi took power and changed 
the constitution both Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center adopted a critical 
discourse highlighting themes such as gender inequality and increasing violations 
against religious minorities in Egypt. The position of the two TNGOs coincides with 
the US government’s scepticism towards democratic Islamist rule10. Although 
TNGOs often seek to reconcile civic movement and grassroots oriented priorities 
with formal organizational and institutional objectives, the statements by Human 
Rights Watch and the Carter Center confirm organizational ambivalence aiming at 
an intermediate position. Such a standpoint will require the implementation of 
parallel and occasionally overlapping functions. Hence organizations build 
partnerships with states or state linked institutions such as the UN system11. Under 
such a framework organizations interact with home and host states as well as 
international institutions. The recent legal actions by Egypt against “foreign NGOs” 
attest to the existence of competing ideological and institutional platforms within 
and around TNGOs12. The Egyptian judiciary accused western TNGOs of 
undermining the country’s political authority, sovereignty and state legitimacy. For 
their part western states from which most indicted NGOs and funding originate 
defended the credibility of these organizations. Consequently TNGOs create 
tension within Egypt and beyond. For the supporters of the military regime, the 
action of raiding “foreign NGOs” and confiscating their equipment was justified as 
Egypt is a sovereign state with legitimacy to control national territory. For them 
democracy has limitations as “there are red lines” under which civil society could 
not exist unregulated and beyond the state. For human rights activists the action 
against the TNGOs was “unprecedented and directly targeted all NGOs”. For them 
                                                 
8 http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/egypt-2011-
2012-final-rpt.pdf.  
9 Carter Center statement at: http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-081713.html 
10 Trager, 2001  
11 Peter Willetts. “Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics” in J. B. 
Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, second edition, 2001), pp. 356-383. 
12 Helle Malmvig and Christina Lassen. “The Arab Uprisings: Regional Implications and International 
Responses, Transitions in the Arab World”, EMed. Mediterranean Yearbook, 2013. 
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the campaign resulted from a long term government manipulation of public 
discourse portraying TNGOs as “serving for external actors”. In contrast TNGOs 
consider themselves as “the voice that upholds human rights, exposes abuses 
[making them] heroes of the revolution which the military aims to silence”.13 Such 
claims remain debatable but powerful states and international organizations such 
as the UN, though formally supporting the prevailing discourse of national 
sovereignty, funded and encouraged TNGO efforts. For their part TNGOs interact 
and cooperate with national and transnational civil society constituents in creating 
“transnational governance spaces”14. With emphasis on mobilization oriented 
activities TNGOs contribute to the formation of essential associational and 
expressive spaces. Though such efforts might occasionally appear partial and 
reflect ideological frames, the involvement generates alternative transnational 
mechanisms for Egyptians and their NGOs to counter military rule.  
 
The recent history  
Military elites with authoritarian leaderships have dominated Egyptian politics since 
195215. All three former presidents, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, reigned with 
usurpation and systematic persecution of political opponents16. The military 
restricted non state sponsored alternative public spheres. Under such 
circumstances, civic movements and organizations had the option of either 
accepting co-option or risking long term imprisonment and torture. Through 
successive emergency measures, authorities curbed public liberties and mobility17. 
For decades the Egyptian military elite justified such actions with reference to 
nation-building priorities, prevailing cold war geostrategic considerations and 
threats from global extremism. The pattern consolidated a praetorian state under 
which the military and collaborative elites reproduced socio-political as well as 
economic underdevelopment and increasingly polarized civil society18. 
Nonetheless citizens, victimized by years of military rule, maintained 
indomitable resistance countering excessive state oppression. In order to 
                                                 
13 See more at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCdS5YZXOVE (Aljazeera program “Inside 
Story” invited Egyptian scholar supporting the regime, Human rights Watch representative and a 
political commentator to discuss implications and consequences of Egypt’s treatment of NGOs.) 
14 Sabine Lang.  NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere,  Cambridge University Press, 2013 
15 Atef Said. “The Paradox of Transition to "Democracy" under Military Rule” Social Research: An 
International Quarterly, 2012, 79/2: 271-298.  
16 Anthony McDermott. Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A flawed Revolution, Routledge 2013.   
17 Stachursky, 2013   
18 Steven Cook. Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria 
and Turkey, John Hopkins University Press 2007. 
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undermine any emerging opposition and consolidate “oligarchic kleptocracy”, 
Egyptian rulers perennially employed a “divide and rule” strategy creating social 
fragmentation and enmity among the population19. Equally critical, powerful states 
such as the USA, from which the regime receives sizable funding, as well as 
international organizations and TNGOs, complicated the state-society relationship 
in the country. The externalization of development mechanisms worries Arab public 
opinion that considers western TNGOs as “elitist organizations with limited 
accountability promoting particular interest”20. Consequently for the military regime 
the quest for external legitimacy appears desirable rather than securing the more 
accountability demanding internal legitimacy. Eventually the waves of uprising that 
engulfed Middle Eastern and Northern African countries in 2011 temporarily 
overturned this elite and state centred political structure. Witnessing the involuntary 
departure of the Tunisian dictator Ben Ali, the military elite in Egypt initially 
unsuccessfully tried to constrain the Egyptian people from diverse social, economic 
and ideological backgrounds from mobilizing. The efforts failed as protesters 
occupied public squares demanding “rahil” the departure of the “nidam” regime. 
Likewise the international impetus and media attention at the time surrounding the 
uprising facilitated and to a certain extent accelerated national, regional and 
transnational political and technological opportunities. If in the past Egyptians 
mainly engaged transnationally to bypass domestic pressure and avoid 
persecution, the political opportunities in early 2011 of a world witnessing a 
potentially changing region reduced the gap between national and transnational 
mobilization and institutionalization dimensions of civic engagement. For instance 
for a period Tahrir and other Egyptian protest squares attained global inspirational 
status21.  
The national and transnational civic mobilizations occurred in diverse 
competing and complementary levels. Firstly the local social level in which organic 
associations best articulate relevant socio-political issues. Among such 
constituents include religious and traditional kinship components. During the 
uprising their main goal was to achieve change with the basic demand of freedom 
and autonomy. The second level arises from the interaction with the state (the 
                                                 
19 Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio. “After Mubarak, Before Transition: The Challenges for 
Egypt’s Democratic Opposition”, Interface: a journal for and about social movements Event 
Analysis, 4 (1): 102 – 112: 2012.   
20 Nicola Pratt.  “Hegemony and Counter-hegemony in Egypt: Advocacy NGOs, Civil Society, and 
the State, in NGOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD”, supra note 31, at 123, 124. 
21 Joseph E. Stiglitz “The Globalization of Protest” Project Syndicate at: 
http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz144/English.  
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military regime). The army controls the security apparatus such as the military and 
other enforcement agencies. At the national level both supporting and oppositional 
networks operate under this hierarchical structure. Depending on declared policies 
such diverse groups could either support the status quo or advocate for change. 
The third level relates to the international/supra national level in which international 
organizations such the UN, EU, AU and the World Bank pursue designed 
strategies and projects. Similar to the national arena, transnational networks 
include constituents calling for change and others preferring the status quo. Finally, 
we have national NGOs operating at transnational networking level. Under such 
circumstances, TNGOs often sympathize with local activism in demanding for 
change, while in practical terms organizations rely on states (regimes) for 
institutional collaboration and networking within the transnational public sphere. 
The regime in Egypt controls and occasionally degrades NGOs. One of the main 
sources for NGO funding is USAID while the US government is the main donor for 
the Egyptian regime. Meanwhile religious NGOs such as the Muslim brotherhood 
remain in a precarious situation due to the movement’s resistance as well as its 
semi-political function. The stated religious goals of the Muslim brotherhood and 
related movements differ from aims stressed by the secular leftists and feminist 
organizations. Similarly their relationships with the state and TNGOs diverge. 
Though religious groups remain locally rooted their networks operate and extend 
transnationally22. After accessing power with contested democratic elections the 
leadership of the Muslim brotherhood missed a unique opportunity to reach out to 
opposing ideological forces for compromise. Instead the brotherhood embarked on 
a transnational ideological campaign.    
 
Transnational activism and TNGOs  
In theory, TNGOs participate in networks driven by individual activists and related 
groups sharing “beliefs and identities”. These activists pursue trans-border social, 
humanitarian and political activities in which “cultural framing” plays a central role. 
More specifically TNGOs obtain transnational expertise and knowledge that is 
necessary for global developmental debates seeking solutions for “instances of 
Problematic justice”23 and social inequalities. In countries like Egypt where such 
organizations confront bureaucratic   obstructions, TNGO activists employ the so-
                                                 
22 Peter Mandeville. “Transnational Muslim solidarities and everyday life”, Nations & Nationalism, 
2011,   17/1:7-24.  
23 Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Cambridge: Polity Press 
1990.   
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called “boomerang networking pattern”. The aim is to externalize and through the 
collection of sensitive information valorise domestic claims which the authoritarian 
regime initially ignores and supresses. The motivation for such endeavour derives 
from moral/ethical values rather than political ambitions and the personal gains of 
transnational activists24. From this perspective TNGOs often put maximum 
pressure on authoritarianism, while leaving others to compete for access to 
influence and power.   
Such transnational activists also qualify as “rooted cosmopolitans” with the 
involvement of not just transnational networking but also with concrete social 
movement engagement and “trans-border activism”. Apart from politically “framing 
issues” such activists and organizations engage in “contentious politics” with the 
purpose of accessing national and transnational power and resources. TNGOs 
operate through “connective structures” in which institutions, technology, 
management and leadership play critical roles. In practice TNGOs implement 
“franchising” activities by establishing branches and offices in different countries. 
The existence of “political opportunity structures” enhances the capability of 
TNGOs to mobilize relevant civic activities in home and host environments. 
Therefore the domestic national structure remains foundational for the operation of 
TNGOs.  In addition the unpredictability of “scale shift” makes a significant 
difference if transnational engagement seeks civic capability reconfiguration. Scale 
shift refers to “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions 
to a different focal point, invoking a new range of actors, objects and broadened 
claims”25. With this approach TNGOs might negotiate and even share institutional 
power with authoritarianism.      
Furthermore TNGOs reproduce not just moral and cosmopolitan norms 
through transnational networking but also new forms of governmentality and 
asymmetric power relations trying to bypass nation states. Such transnational 
networks have together with international agencies such as the IMF and World 
Bank, “taken over the governmentality of, for instance, vulnerable parts of the 
world. TNGOs often bridge the sovereignty of developing nations in comparison to 
the developed countries. Operationally TNGOs might reflect the characteristics of 
“western bureaucratic organization” designed to maintain “liberal global order” with 
                                                 
24 M.  Keck and K.Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 
Ithaca 1998. 
25 Tarrow, 2005 
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an emphasis on secularism26. Under this hegemonic and hierarchical structure, 
TNGOs often seek institutional privilege.    
In relation to the African continent TNGOs might exercise “independent 
sovereignty”.  Unlike other more consolidated regions (states) in the world “both the 
African state and the civil society operate within a trans-nationalized environment 
and global context”27. Consequently countries find themselves almost “ruled by 
trans-nationalized networks under which condition few countries remain sovereign 
not because countries are invaded or conquered but because complex networks 
rule and pressure these countries from distance”. In countries like Egypt, we often 
see diverse projects designed by “people sitting in transnational distant places”28.      
In recent years due to technological and communicational development, global civil 
society attained greater significance in issues of transnational social mobilization 
and organization. Liberalization, originally designed to expand global markets, 
provided civil society with alternative opportunities to confront and bypass the 
state. Over the years, expanded liberalization had, however, instead of promoting 
democratization, undermined state capacity and fragmented society into haves and 
have-nots. Under such a global liberal environment, we find not just cosmopolitans, 
the activists involved in global justice movements and cultural innovation, but also 
TNGOs with contentious organizational hegemonic capacity29.  
 
Diverging Egyptian forces with conflicting political goals    
In a complex globalized world diverse civil societies maintain formal and informal 
connectivity across diverse nations and territories. During political upheavals, i.e. 
the Arab uprising, civil society movements and organizations have intensified 
transnational civic exchanges. Similarly TNGOs systematically engage and invest 
in actual processes with the aim of influencing and achieving suitable outcomes30. 
The ideological and organizational priorities of these organizations combined with 
the tension and suffering often expressed in the national and transnational public 
spheres as well as the concerns of the communities scattered across the world 
                                                 
26 James Ferguson. Global Shadows, Africa in the neoliberal order, Duke University Press 2006. 
27 Ferguson, 2006     
28 Vincent Durac. ‘The Impact of External Actors on the Distribution of Power in the Middle East: 
The Case of Egypt’, The Journal of North African Studies, 2009, 14/1:75–90. 
29 Sidney Tarrow. The New Transnational Activism, Cornell University 2005.    
30 Benjamin Stachursky, The promise and perils of transnationalisation: NGO Activism and the 
socialization women’s human rights in Egypt and Iran, Rutledge 2013.   
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contribute to such endeavour31. The general public discourse also mobilizes 
communities linking them to their host countries and societies. The grievances and 
the daily pictures projected by national movements and organizations and their 
confrontations with oppressive states also inspire “global public protest” motivating 
people to act individually as well as collectively32.   
TNGOs operating in developing countries such as Egypt often have to 
balance the dynamics of mobilization necessary for the empowerment of wider civil 
society and the institutionalized pragmatism tendencies required in dealing with 
powerful political and institutional constituents.  This creates a dialectical tension 
and controversy. The ambivalence further explains the reluctance of TNGOs in 
initially taking sides in controversial state-society conflicts. TNGOs depend on the 
backing of both the civic mobilization side as well as the institutional side. While the 
roots and sympathy might lie on the mobilization side, managerial and structural 
aspects belong to the institutional dimension of the state. The absence of a 
transnational public sphere with the capability to connect local indigenous traditions 
sustains this collective action dilemma33.   
One crucial factor in this context is the external funding that plays a critical 
role in state-society relations in developing countries and is occasionally a source 
of tension and struggle among NGOs for accessing economic privileges and 
recognition34. Funding regimes often exercise influence and might even seek to 
govern local NGOs directly. Therefore it remains unclear whether the essence of 
transformative agency emanates from nationally mobilized movements and 
organizations, or whether it is from the link with and supervision from TNGOs. In 
most circumstances, for developing countries like Egypt, the distinction between 
national and international boundaries appears blurred as both the state and civil 
society depend on external support eventually undermining national sovereignty35.  
In this complex environment of interdependence with multiple competing actors, 
TNGOs seem better positioned to deal with challenges. Their ability to link and 
influence both the diverse transnational social groups and different states confirms 
the centrality of such organizations. Similarly local NGOs often navigate between 
                                                 
31Işık KUŞÇU. “The Egyptian American Diaspora During and in the Aftermath of the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011”, Ortadoğu Etütleri, 2012, 4/1:121-142.  
32 Seumas Milne. The Revenge of History: The Battle for the 21st Century, Verso Books 2012. 
33 Nancy Fraser. Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World, Columbia 
University Press 2009. 
34 Altan Ozlem and Ahmet Icduygu. “Mapping Civil Society in the Middle East: The Cases of Egypt, 
Lebanon and Turkey”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2012, 39(2): 157-179. 
35 Riad El-Ghonemy, “Introduction” in (eds.) M Riad El-Ghonemy, Egypt in the 21st century, 
Rutledge 2004. 
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transnational ideological demands and state hegemony. While counterhegemonic 
NGOs risk exclusion and underfunding, cultural, religious and women NGOs could 
become targets for ideological exploitation36. Such tendencies raise doubts with 
respect to TNGOs’ objectivity in relation to the mobilization and empowerment of 
locally rooted cosmopolitans confronting an antagonistic national regime.    
TNGOs, through “rooted cosmopolitans”, activists and “connective 
structures”, influenced the struggle to oust Mubarak. They sympathized with and 
valorised the protests innovating   expressional space in Tahrir and other 
squares37. NGOs originally started their work with humanitarian and advocacy 
activities partially funded and encouraged by neo-liberal tendencies. IMF 
sanctioned liberalism disrupted the socio-economic pattern as structural 
adjustment programmes severed basic food subsidies for the poor38. Furthermore 
the creation of a transnational frame and space attracted rooted cosmopolitans 
from both the west and east together. Initially the Egyptian state tolerated such 
global protest mobilizations taking place in Tahrir Square, mainly because it dealt 
with the Palestinian intifada and the Iraqi wars39. This window of opportunity 
mobilized Egyptians nationally and transnationally and gradually generated more 
or less formalized popular activism connected to different parts of the world. When 
the right moment came with the Egyptian uprising, civic groups exploited the 
relationship with diverse national and transnational movements and organizations 
from which Egyptians received support.  
The affiliation with external foreign actors, though seemingly beneficial in 
certain aspects, divides Egyptian NGOs, fragments society and confirms the 
existence of post-colonial dependence40. Henceforth TNGOs might avoid directly 
promoting public mobilization and prefer instead to pursue networking, 
opportunities for valorisation and creating platforms for exchanging and 
transmitting ideas of the good life.  
One of the major problems confronting TNGOs in contributing to lasting 
political transformation is the lack of the so-called indigenous connection to 
communities at the local level. So far the scattered Diaspora communities have the 
                                                 
36  Benoit Challand. “The Counter-Power of Civil Society and the Emergence of a New Political 
Imaginary in the Arab World”, Constellations, 2011, 18/3: 271-283.  
37 Anna Newby. “U.S. Civil Society Assistance to Egypt: Thinking Long Term”, Middle East Studies, 
2012, 21/2: 327–352.    
38 John Salevurakis and Sahar Abdel-Haleim. “Bread Subsidies in Egypt: Choosing Social Stability 
or Fiscal Responsibility”, Review of Radical Political Economics, 2008, 40/1: 35-49.    
39 Abdelrahman, 2009  
40 Julia Elyachar.  “Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-Governmental Organizations, and 
the Value of Culture in Egypt”, Public Culture, 2002, 14(3): 493–513.   
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capacity to deliver some sort of simultaneous transnational linkages to host and 
homeland environments. In addition global movements for justice promote targeted 
projects on issues such as democratization, human rights and gender. 
Undoubtedly transnational NGOs provide alternative platforms for oppressed civil 
society. With transnational networks, global deliberations and civic engagements 
emerge from the existing connection at the local, national and transnational levels. 
In Egypt the cases of the Academy for Change shows that Diaspora originated 
TNGOs have empowered the mobilization and education of Egyptian youth during 
the uprising41. Unlike conventional TNGOs Diaspora rooted organizations build 
upon indigenous connections that facilitate the flow of transnational resources to 
concrete local entrepreneurship developments. In contrast, the activities of for 
instance the Carter Center, Human Rights Watch and other TNGOs show the 
continuing struggle to reduce the gap between competing mobilization and 
organizational tendencies.       
Transnational networking emanates from diversified sources. Egypt has 
been the target of EU liberalization and democratization policies oriented towards 
the region. Such policies fostered both favourable and oppositional social 
mobilization platforms. For instance western countries funded transnational 
projects which facilitated transnational civic negotiations and empowerment. In 
addition there are opposition groups, often exiled from their countries by 
authoritarian regimes, linking in western countries from which Diaspora activists 
and organizations mobilize resources42. Transnational community movements, i.e. 
Diaspora constituents, link to transnational NGOs at the beginning to contribute to 
humanitarian tasks but gradually pursue greater political and social 
institutionalization. The liberal public space in more democratic countries provides 
Diaspora communities opportunities to mobilize and engage.  
 
Removing an authoritarian but not authoritarianism    
The January 2011 uprising removed an authoritarian ruler but the current situation 
attests to the failure of the upheaval in dismantling dictatorship. Though not the 
major cause, TNGOs, as well as their home countries, reacting calmly to the 
military, partially contributed to this outcome. TNGOs no longer unambiguously 
side with civic mobilization against the continuing military consolidation. In 
                                                 
41 See more at: http://wagingnonviolence.org/2011/04/the-role-of-the-academy-of-change-in-egypts-
uprising/ 
42 Sean Yom. “Civil society and democratization in the Arab world” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, 2005, 9/4:14-33. 
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accordance with policy positions taken by home states TNGOs call for national 
dialogue, restraint and better management from military rulers:  
For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a coup. The 
army take over, depose and imprison the democratically elected 
president, suspend the constitution, arrest the usual suspects, close 
down television stations and mass their armour in the streets of the 
capital. But the word ‘coup’ does not – and cannot – cross the lips of the 
Blessed Barack Obama43. 
 
It was not just TNGOs and their sponsoring states but Egyptian intellectuals also 
refrained from opposing the coup. A prominent Egyptian leftist scholar contends 
the following:  
The fall of Morsi and of the rule of Muslim Brotherhood came as 
expected. Firstly, the government of the Muslim Brothers has been 
pursuing the same neoliberal policies as that of Mubarak, and even 
worse. It could not solve any of the problems faced by the Egyptian 
people. Secondly, Morsi was elected as a result of a gigantic 
fraud….Millions were given to people to buy their votes. The Muslim 
Brotherhood were mobilized to control the polling stations, which made it 
impossible for the others to vote, to such an extent that the Egyptian 
judges who normally oversee the election were disgusted and withdrew 
their support for the election process. Despite that, the US Embassy and 
Europe declared the election was perfect. This is how Morsi was 
elected44. 
 
Amin expresses a valid critique that both the military and the religious 
organizations in their economic priorities embrace a neoliberal orientation. 
Together they manage a large portion of the Egyptian economy. Many Egyptians 
work for and get so-called "welfare" services from them. The almost never-ending 
conflict between the two powerful organizations (one supposedly secular, the other 
religious) might lead to the collapse of order. It happened in Somalia and it is 
currently generating the semi-collapse of Syria- and it might possibly lead to some 
sort of ongoing disorder and disenchantment in Egypt. Both organizations benefit 
from powerful transnational networks.   
On the other hand, Africans have this time chosen the civilian side. African 
leaders suspended Egypt's membership in the AU while some countries in the 
continent severed diplomatic relations with Cairo. Historically the continent has had 
considerable experience of military coups.  
                                                 
43 Robert Fisk at:” http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/when-is-a-military-coup-not-a-
military-coup-when-it-happens-in-egypt-apparently-8688000.html”  
44 Samir Amin at: “http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article1817”   
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With the January uprising of 2011, TNGOs expected a more open and 
western oriented democratic Egypt. Instead, better-organized Islamic groups won 
the elections and the subsequent referendum. Responses from several TNGOs 
indicate their disappointment with developments in Egypt. TNGOs criticised the 
process of constitutional reform, particularly on gender issues and the pressure on 
foreign NGOs operating in Egypt. TNGOs failed to take a tougher stand against the 
Egyptian coup for two main reasons. The first relate to “rooted cosmopolitans” that 
operate through transnational “connective” structures with contentious power 
political national institutions that constrain TNGOs. According to this perspective in 
“contentious politics” TNGOs might choose cooperation rather than confrontation 
with governments. In addition some western governments have little sympathy for 
the Muslim brotherhood taking power in Egypt. Islamists leading powerful countries 
like Egypt and Turkey might transform the region in favour of implementing 
alternative socio-political structures. It is possible that conflicting signals sent by 
western governments and TNGOs after Morsi took power might have convinced 
the military to reclaim power.  
Secondly the international impetus for the “Arab spring” no longer exists. 
With the absence of a global civic movement, TNGOs prefer to concentrate on 
institutional organizational conditions.       
 
The way forward     
The case of Egypt following the January 2011 uprising and the subsequent July 
2013 coup shows that TNGOs actively contribute to the development of and 
political transformation in developing countries. Their contribution depends on the 
prevailing power relations and dynamics of the local, national and transnational 
circumstances. TNGOs seek to balance the mobilization dimension, which is often 
popular and civic-oriented, with the organizational aspects necessary for 
organizations to operate in politically contentious institutional environments. 
Responses from TNGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and the Carter Center, to 
the Egyptian January 2011 uprising and to the military coup in July 2013, confirm 
this pattern.  
The Egyptian conflict remains unresolved and continues to dominate 
debates in international politics. Furthermore the case illustrates the failure of post-
colonial politics and decades’ long authoritarianism sustained by geopolitically 
motivated external interventions. Consequently the Egyptian people fragmented 
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into diverse political and social groups linked to complex transnational constituents. 
For instance the two most powerful groups, the military complex and the Muslim 
brotherhood, both retain international networks. Power and substantial political 
struggle in Egypt revolve around these two powerful contenders and their formal 
and informal national and international networks. The military remains the main 
industrial producer and property owner in the country. This economic platform links 
the army to the global economy. General Abdalaziz Sisi, the top military figure, 
currently gets funds from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which consolidates his 
position and a process of constitutional reform favouring military consolidation and 
a potential presidential career for himself.  
For its part the Muslim brotherhood as a religious organization interacts with 
transnational devotional networks in almost every country in the world. Thus their 
persecution in Egypt is unlikely to succeed as the organization has transnational 
offices and a membership that will persist in challenging the military. In between 
the two competing heavyweights the Egyptian people suffer. Increasingly some 
new movements are trying to emerge in Egypt calling for consensus for the sake of 
Egypt. Activists established multi-religious and multi-ideological networks seeking 
to overcome the entrenched military-brotherhood dilemma by concentrating on 
non-ideological solutions rather than the usual confrontation45. These new 
movements have the potential to help Egypt overcome the stalemate.  
Therefore despite the presence of authoritarianism in Egypt the civic call 
and mobilization for “eiash, karama & Horiyah” (Bread, dignity and freedom) 
continues to send a resonating message. The reason is that the overwhelming 
majority of Egyptians are young people, many of them connected to the world and 
exposed to the livelihoods in more prosperous parts of the world. Besides, the 
funding from richer countries currently partially ensuring military superiority in the 
country might not persist.  
At the moment TNGOs seem reluctant fully to oppose Egyptian 
authoritarianism. Therefore it is difficult conclusively to categorize these 
organizations as transnational network activists, rooted cosmopolitans that depend 
on political opportunities, or transnational cultural platforms for hegemonic state(s).  
                                                 
45 See more in “Coup or Revolution”, Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, 
50/ I: 7, page I, August 2013. 
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